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Abstract
Czech doctrinal researchers conclude that decisions of the Czech Constitutional Court are – at least 
in some respect – bind lower courts pro futuro. Although continental legal systems do not officially 
subscribe to a doctrine of precedent, a quasi-precedential role of the jurisprudence of higher courts 
is often defended by theorists. However, this theory of quasi-precedent has never been empirically 
tested  in  the  Czech  Republic.  This  dissertation  constitutes  a  first  such  attempt  as  it  examines 
whether  courts  actually  decide  in  practice  according  to  the  jurisprudence  of  the  Czech 
Constitutional Court. Specifically, it focuses on a guideline decision by the Czech Constitutional 
Court on parole decisions made in 2018. The guideline decision emphasized that parole decisions – 
made by courts in the Czech legal system and not by parole boards or committees – constitute a 
systemic  problem since  they  are  poorly  reasoned  and  as  a  result  they  are  ambiguous  and  not 
persuasive.  The  guideline  decision  in  detail  stated  what  reasons  can  be  used  to  justify  parole 
decision  and  how  various  factors,  such  as  previous  convictions,  should  be  interpreted  when 
deciding on parole. This dissertation studies two groups of first-level courts’ decisions: Those made 
right before the guideline decision and those made a year later. Based on a content analysis of these 
decisions, this dissertation concludes that the guideline decision had zero impact on the decision-
making of first-level courts. The quality of parole decisions remained very low, albeit the guidance 
provided by the Czech Constitutional Court. These findings have implications both for theorists, 
Constitutional court and policy-makers. Theorists might need to embrace a realist perspective to 
bridge the gap between law-in-books and law-in-action. Constitutional court might need to employ 
new methods destined to persuade lower courts  to  follow its  jurisprudence.  And policy-makers 
might need to exploit different measures to improve the quality of parole decisions.
